The World Bank and Conflicts. From Narrow Rules to Broader Principles by Lie, Jon Harald Sande
NUPI Report
Security in Practice no. 9
[A Publication in the NUPI Series on Security in Practice]
Norsk 
Utenrikspolitisk 
Institutt
Norwegian Institute 
of International 
Affairs
The World Bank and Conﬂicts
From Narrow Rules to Broader Principles
Jon Harald Sande Lie
{Multinational Experiment 5 [MNE5]}
Utgiver: 
Copyright:
ISSN:
ISBN:
Besøksadresse:
Addresse:
Internett:
E-post:
Fax:
Tel:
NUPI
© Norsk Utenrikspolitisk Institutt 2008
82-7002-189-x
978-82-7002-189-5
Alle synspunkter står for forfatternes regning. De må ikke 
tolkes som uttrykk for oppfatninger som kan tillegges Norsk 
Utenrikspolitisk Institutt. Artiklene kan ikke reproduseres 
– helt eller delvis – ved trykking, fotokopiering eller på 
annen måte uten tillatelse fra forfatterne.
Any views expressed in this publication are those of the 
author. They should not be interpreted as reﬂecting the 
views of the Norwegian Institute of International Affairs. 
The text may not be printed in part or in full without the 
permission of the author.
C.J. Hambrosplass 2d
Postboks 8159 Dep. 
0033 Oslo 
www.nupi.no
pub@nupi.no
[+ 47] 22 36 21 82
[+ 47] 22 99 40 00
The World Bank and Conﬂicts
From Narrow Rules to Broader Principles
Jon Harald Sande Lie
{Multinational Experiment 5 [MNE5]}
[Summary] This paper focuses on the World Bank and its relevance to conﬂicts, peace-
building and post-conﬂict reconstruction. It relates to the international trend of increas-
ingly more eﬀorts put into inter-agency cooperation, multi-functional operations and 
policy harmonization – all of which come as a response to a new understanding of inter-
national conﬂicts and crises, and how best to respond to and solve them. This implies 
operations spanning the traditionally separate development, security and humanitarian 
segments. Due to its institutionalised apolitical mandate, organisational culture and 
focus on speciﬁc core competencies the World Bank has for a long time sidelined itself 
from integrating eﬀorts as seen among other international actors. The World Bank is, 
however, increasingly being called upon to partake in international operations with other 
organisations. This and an altered comprehension of the complexities of conﬂict-aﬀected 
countries have made the Bank more open to engage in crises and emergencies and to 
coordinate with other actors. This paper elaborates these changes against the backdrop 
of the conventional interpretation of the Bank’s apolitical mandate and its focus on 
core competencies. It outlines recent policy changes internal to the Bank that open for 
a stronger engagement in situations of crises and emergencies. These changes seek to 
dismantle rigid and narrow rules and rather provide a broader framework and principles 
that are case and context sensitive. 
This report is part of the Norwegian engagement in the Multinational Experiment 5 
(MNE5), where Norway participates through NATO ACT. The project is ﬁnanced by 
the Norwegian Ministry of Defence and managed by the National Joint Headquarters. 
Besides NUPI, the Norwegian Defence Research Establishment and the Defence Staﬀ 
Collage are also engaged in the programme. More information can be found at: http://
mne.oslo.mil.no

Preface 
 
This paper focuses on the World Bank and its relevance to conflicts, peace-
building and post-conflict reconstruction.  
The World Bank’s mission statement articulates the grand ambition of a 
world free of poverty – ‘…to fight poverty with passion and professionalism 
for lasting results. To help people help themselves and their environment by 
providing resources, sharing knowledge, building capacity and forging part-
nerships in the private and public sectors.’1 As this paper will show, there are 
several ambiguities as to how the World Bank pursues this objective, par-
ticularly in fragile states and in conflict-affected countries. The Bank’s 
strictly apolitical mandate has largely restricted its engagement in political, 
defence and security-related issues. Recently, however, greater recognition 
of the security–development nexus has been gaining ground, enhancing the 
Bank’s capability to respond to situations from which it previously kept 
aloof. This comes through adopting a new policy, which is the specific focus 
of this paper.  
The new operational policy of the World Bank – Rapid Response to Cri-
ses and Emergency – will be presented in its historical and institutional con-
text, so that we can follow the trajectory of the Bank’s changing role. This 
has been a process leading from narrow and restrictive rules to broader prin-
ciples that need to be contextually applied and negotiated.  
Basic to the new policy is the heightened consensus within the interna-
tional community that war-to-peace transitions represent a continuum rather 
than distinct points in time. This calls for new comprehensive thinking and 
approaches, across the traditionally distinct spheres of the military, relief, 
recovery and development, through inter-agency and multi-functional com-
prehensive approaches aimed at facilitating the transition from conflict to 
lasting peace. Further, it means involving various actors in a coordinated 
manner, taking into account the comparative advantages and core competen-
cies of their organisations, along the entire war-to-peace continuum.  
Inter-agency and multi-functional responses to conflicts are referred to by 
a range of terms: the UN with its Integrated Mission,2 NATO with its Com-
prehensive Approach through Effects Based Approach to Operations3 
through civil–military cooperation,4 and the endeavours of various govern-
ments to integrate their diplomacy, defence and development efforts in 
‘whole-of-government’ approaches5 all represent processes that subscribe to 
the same rationale of actor and policy coherence to increase effectiveness 
and efficiency in addressing the war-to-peace continuum. This paper focuses 
                                                     
1  World Bank Mission Statement, released 14 January 1999. 
2  Espen Barth Eide, A. T. Kaspersen, R. Kent & K. v. Hippel, 2005, ‘Report on Integrated 
Missions. Practical Perspectives and Recommendations’. Oslo: NUPI. 
3  MNE, The Comprehensive Approach: A Conceptual Framework for MNE5. A Draft 
Working Paper. Version 0.11, Multinational Experimentation Joint Futures Lab; US Joint 
Forces Command. 18 September 2007. 
4  NATO, 2003. AJP-9 NATO civil–military co-operation (CIMIC) Doctrine.  
5  See Patrick Stewart and Kaysie Brown, 2007, Greater than the sum of its parts? Assess-
ing ‘whole of government’ approaches to fragile states. New York: International Peace 
Academy.  
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on the potential relevance of the World Bank in such comprehensive ap-
proaches.  
Comprehensive Approach 
 
The concept of Comprehensive Approach (CA), as applied within the MNE5 
community, is pivotal to this paper.6 According to the Draft Working Paper 
(see note 3 above, p. 6), Comprehensive Approach describes:  
 
[the] wide scope of actions undertaken in a coordinated and collaborative man-
ner with the affected nation(s) by national and multinational civilian govern-
ment agencies and possibly, military forces, international and intergovernmental 
organizations, non-governmental organizations and the private sector to achieve 
greater harmonization in the analysis, planning, management, and evaluation of 
actions required to prevent, ameliorate, mitigate and/or resolve the condition 
precipitating the crisis.  
 
CA is a response to the new forms of international crisis that have emerged 
since the end of the Cold War. Crises deriving from inter- or intra-state con-
flict, failed states, transnational terrorism, and natural disasters as caused by 
e.g. draught and famine call for non-conventional responses: a coordinated 
and coherent approach on the part of actors from the entire international 
community. Inherent to this view is a rejection of understanding causes and 
solutions to conflict in a sequential manner, in favour of a more holistic ap-
proach. The Comprehensive Approach can be illustrated in highly simplified 
form by the following figure.  
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Figure 1. Comprehensive approach.7 
                                                     
6  MNE5 is a programme for concept development and experimentation that seeks to im-
prove means and methods for enhanced coordination and cooperation between civil and 
military actors spanning the political, development, economic, humanitarian and military 
efforts of various actors. The objective is to harmonise and improve international and 
multi-functional peace and crises management.  
7  The model is taken from Cdr Jacques Sueur (Centre Interarmèes de Concepts, Doctrines 
et Expérimentations; Ministère de la Defence, France): The Context of EBAO and the 
Comprehensive Approach – The French Approach; PowerPoint Presentation at Effects 
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A Comprehensive Approach proposes that actors representing the diplo-
matic, economic (including development) and military means should share 
strategic guidance, so as to ensure early cooperation and collaboration be-
tween civilian and military actors in order to achieve their mutually agreed 
goals and objectives.  
If peace and stability are the desired goals of all the actors involved, the 
Comprehensive Approach suggests that they work together and coordinate 
their military, diplomatic, development and economic means. The World 
Bank should thus be a prominent actor, given its important role with regard 
to international development generally and its core competencies of eco-
nomic growth and sustainable development particularly. This, however, has 
not been the case. The Bank’s conventional response to such a continuum 
would be to withdraw in cases of erupting crisis and re-engage later in the 
post-conflict phase.  
There are, however, ongoing processes within the World Bank that 
largely comply with the security–development nexus and the need for 
stronger engagement in conflict-affected countries. These are not explicitly 
linked to processes external to the Bank. There exist links (albeit not formal-
ised) between the World Bank and UN peacekeeping missions, but these are 
more on the ad-hoc level and have remained confined to the World Bank–
UN interface.8 This paper focuses on the relevance of the World Bank to 
conflict-affected countries, with particular attention to recent alterations in 
its guiding operational policy on emergencies and conflicts. 
 
The World Bank and ‘Comprehensiveness’ 
The World Bank has wide experience of working with comprehensive ap-
proaches to development. In 1999 it adopted the Comprehensive Develop-
ment Framework (CDF)9 as the philosophical underpinning of its main lend-
ing instrument, poverty reduction strategy papers (PRSPs).10 The CDF and 
PRSPs, however, do not focus on security, defence or politics: they are con-
structed in line with the World Bank’s apolitical mandate and its identity as a 
development agency, and thus focus solely on what have been defined as its 
core competencies – economic growth and sustainable development. The 
PRSP, as the main instrument for poverty alleviation, is thus not specifically 
designed for managing post-conflict transitions in fragile states.11  
                                                     
Based Approach to Operations (EBAO) Seminar, Baltic Defence College 12–13 March 
2008.  
8  Madalene O’Donnell, 2005, UN Peacekeeping and the World Bank: Perceptions of Sen-
ior Managers in the Field. United Nations Peacekeeping; External Study, Center on Inter-
national Cooperation.  
9  James Wolfensohn, 1999. A proposal for a comprehensive development framework. A 
discussion draft to the Board, management, and staff of the World Bank Group, 21 Janu-
ary 1999. Available at www.worldbank.org/cdf.   
10  The PRSP is a World Bank requirement imposed on client governments to qualify for 
debt relief and IDA borrowing. Although World Bank and IMF acceptance is needed to 
become effective, it is to be the sovereign product of the borrowing government, describ-
ing the country’s overall macroeconomic, structural and social policies and programmes 
to promote economic growth, achieve sustainable development and reduce poverty. All 
foreign development actors are to support the objectives listed in the government’s PRSP. 
11  Cf. Cedric de Coning, 2007, Coherence and Coordination in United Nations Peacebuild-
ing and Integrated Missions: A Norwegian Perspective. Security in Practice No. 5, NUPI 
report. 
Jon Harald Sande Lie 4 
The World Bank is originally a bank, but in its practice has come to re-
semble a development agency working for economic growth and sustainable 
development, placing it squarely on the development side of the war-to-
peace continuum – and, obviously, on the civilian side of civilian–military 
cooperation. Although the World Bank is not a humanitarian agency and 
does not provide relief directly, there are numerous activities which fall 
within the continuum where it may apply its comparative advantage and core 
competencies. Recognising the security–development nexus and that war-to-
peace transition is a continuum, the Bank has now become more forthcom-
ing on matters relating to conflicts which it previously held at an arm’s 
length.  
This paper presents the current World Bank policy on crises and conflict-
affected countries, and addresses it at the backdrop of recent discursive 
changes within the international community in general and the Bank in par-
ticular. We start off with a brief introduction to the World Bank, focusing on 
issues relevant to the security–development nexus. By introducing the insti-
tutional structure and historical context of the Bank this section seeks to 
bridge the knowledge gap between various actors involved in comprehensive 
approaches in general and civilian–military cooperation in particular.12 
Readers familiar with the World Bank and interested only in its relevance to 
conflict might want to skip this initial section and go directly to The World 
Bank and Conflicts. 
The World Bank – a brief introduction 
 
The World Bank was, along with the International Monetary Fund (IMF), 
conceived in the final years of the Second World War at the United Nations 
Monetary and Financial Conference held at Bretton Woods, New Hamp-
shire, in July 1944.13 The World Bank was formally established on 27 De-
cember 1945 following ratification of the Bretton Woods agreement. Its first 
and thus far largest loan issued to France for post-war reconstruction in 
1947, which was in line with its original mandate to aid the reconstruction of 
post-war Europe. The intention of the Bretton Woods conference was, fur-
ther, to create an international system to solve the economic and political 
challenges of the post-war world, and simultaneously to prevent future major 
crises deriving from economic and political instability. From the very start, 
the World Bank was an international institution established to deal with con-
flict-related issues: conflict prevention and post-conflict reconstruction.  
                                                     
12  Haugevik and de Carvalho highlight this amongst the main challenges to harmonise and 
establish coherence among actors involved in comprehensive approaches. See Kristin M. 
Haugevik and Benjamin de Carvalho, 2007, Civil–Military Cooperation in Multinational 
and Interagency Operation. Discussion paper on occasional terminologies and assessment 
for Multinational Experiment 5 [MNE5]. Security in Practice No. 2, NUPI report.  
13  Hence these two institutions are commonly referred to as Bretton Woods Institutions 
(BWI). A third output of the conference was the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 
(GATT), which in 1994 became the World Trade Organisation (WTO). The WTO is, 
however, not included in the BWIs. This paper deals only with the World Bank, but it 
should be noted that the BWI to a large degree share policies, notably established by their 
joint semi-annual meetings. The main difference between the two is that the IMF provides 
short-term financial and economic ‘shock treatment’ to counter macroeconomic problems, 
whereas the World Bank focuses on long-term reconstruction and development efforts.  
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The World Bank originally comprised only the International Bank for 
Reconstruction and Development (IBRD). Together with the International 
Development Association (IDA; established 1960) these two make up what 
is today commonly referred to as the World Bank. From initially a nick-
name, the World Bank in 1975 became the official shorthand for the IBRD 
and the IDA.14 The IBRD and the IDA are run along the same lines. They 
share premises and staff; they relate to the same board and institutional 
structure, and report to the same senior management. The main distinction 
concerns the division of work. The IBRD lends to middle-income countries 
and credit-worthy poorer countries, while the IDA focuses exclusively on 
low-income and the world’s poorest countries. Consequently the IBRD and 
the IDA finance their lending from different ‘drawers’. While the former 
runs on interest and reimbursement of active loans, the IDA basket is de-
pendent on replenishment from its donors – its member governments. IDA 
loans are ‘softer’ than those of the IBRD and are often denoted as credits, 
grants and concessional lending.15 An IDA loan will typically run over 40 
years with an initial 10-year grace period, at minimal interest intended to 
cover administrative costs.  
The creation of the IDA signified a shift of focus, from reconstruction to 
development, as regards the World Bank. After the reconstruction of Europe 
and in the advent of decolonisation, the World Bank turned its attention to 
the world’s poorest countries, and came to realise that these could not afford 
to borrow capital for development on the terms offered by the IBRD. As a 
corollary, a group of member countries decided to establish the IDA as an 
institution that could lend to the poorest countries on easier (‘softer’) terms.  
These factors, coupled with the discursive influence of the Truman Doc-
trine16 and Cold War geopolitics, impeded World Bank reconstruction efforts 
due to the obvious connections to political matters. Moreover, the basic fact 
that reconstruction implies reconstruction from something that ‘something’ 
could not be the colonial era itself. Thus, and to maintain the organisation’s 
momentum, a stronger need for the ‘D’ than the ‘R’ emerged within the 
IBDR. The creation of the IDA should be seen in this context. Over time, it 
has helped in firmly establishing the World Bank as a development agency.  
Today, the World Bank is undoubtedly the most influential development 
agency in the world. It employs over 10,000 development experts, most of 
them at its headquarters in Washington DC, which thus represents the high-
est concentration of development expertise worldwide. This expertise and 
the organisation’s unprecedented financial muscle represent significant re-
sources that place the World Bank – as an intermediary between powerful 
                                                     
14  The IBRD and the IDA (i.e. the ‘World Bank’) are only two of the five specialised insti-
tutions that comprise the World Bank Group: the other three are the International Finan-
cial Corporation (IFC, established 1956), the Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency 
(MIGA, established 1988) and the International Centre for Settlement of Investment Dis-
putes (ICSID, established 1966). Countries need to belong to the IBRD before joining any 
of the other institutions. Each specialised institution has separate foundational document, 
i.e. Articles of Agreement. To a large extent, however, the five all share the same basic 
values, ideas and terms: e.g. that they should be non-political. 
15  For the purpose of this paper, the ‘World Bank’ refers to the IBRD and the IDA, and 
‘loans’ refer to disbursements made by both the IBRD and the IDA. This is in line with 
common World Bank usage. 
16  The 1949 Truman Doctrine, notably Point Four, outlined ambitious and somewhat ag-
gressive US foreign policy and the role of institutional development as an instrument for 
achieving this.  
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shareholders and borrowing client countries – in the centre of the interna-
tional aid architecture and the global political economy.  
The World Bank is powerful for several well-documented reasons as 
well.17 First, its lending power far exceeds that of other financial institutions, 
and its close relationship with client governments gives it a degree of lever-
age unknown to other lending institutions. Second, mission creep – the ex-
pansion of the initial mission beyond its original scope and goal – has wid-
ened the Bank’s area of interest and responsibility.18 New programmes and 
ideas have not ousted existing ones but have added on, thereby enlarging the 
Bank’s portfolio. The original purpose of European post-war reconstruction 
shifted to a stronger focus on development issues after Europe was rebuilt, 
and with the advent of decolonisation.19 Third is the World Bank’s power to 
persuade through attaching policy conditions to its loans, referred to as ‘pol-
icy-based lending’ or ‘conditionality’. The conditions attached reflect the 
Bank’s interests and how it analyses and aspires to approach client govern-
ments. This stands in contrast to the basic concept of national ownership and 
the bottom–up approaches so central to the PRSP model and general World 
Bank rhetoric. Fourth, there is the production and diffusion of development 
knowledge by World Bank staff, while lending arrangements have begun to 
assume a more rapid and comprehensive form in today’s age of globalisa-
tion. Fifth, the World Bank governance structure and institutional set-up en-
tail that the influence of member countries or shareholders is proportional to 
how much capital they pay in. This provides the United States with effective 
veto power, as illustrated by its de facto appointment of the World Bank 
president – which, furthermore, demonstrates the close connection between 
the World Bank and US politics, notably the Congress and Treasury.20 Seen 
together, all these elements make the World Bank nearly hegemonic within 
the international development segment. The Bank is a powerful institution 
with a potent ability to frame the world.21  
Conflict-focused Development:  Demise and Resurgence 
 
World Bank staff expresses ambiguities on issues related to conflict, recon-
struction and peace building and what the organisation’s role should be. De-
spite the Bank’s grandiose ambition of a ‘world free of poverty, to fight pov-
erty with passion and professionalism for lasting result’,22 the staff inter-
viewed for this paper expressed considerable ambiguity as to how go about 
this, particularly in the context of conflict-affected countries. Many – almost 
by default and always with reference to its apolitical mandate – argued that 
                                                     
17  These points draw on Stone and Wright, 2007, ‘Introduction. The currency of change: 
World Bank lending and learning in the Wolfensohn era’ (pp. 1–25 in Stone and Wright 
The World Bank and Governance. A Decade of Reform and Reaction. London: 
Routledge).  
18  See Jessica Einhorn, 2001, ‘The World Bank’s mission creep’. Foreign Affairs 80 (5): 
22–35. 
19  This will be dealt with in greater detail below.  
20  Susan Park. 2005. ‘Norm Diffusion within International Organisations: A Case Study of 
the World Bank’ Journal for International Relations and Development 8 (2): 114–41. 
21  See Bøås and McNeill (eds.) 2004 Multilateral Institutions and Development. Framing 
the World? London: Routledge.  
22  World Bank Mission Statement, released 14 January 1999. 
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the World Bank could not operate in countries in conflict, and that peace-
building does not fall within its scope. Others, however, argued that the 
Bank should do more to involve itself in these issues, because of the nega-
tive impact that conflicts have on civilian populations and the overall devel-
opment process, referring to the security–development nexus.  
Whereas the former category represents the general view of most staff, 
the latter view reflects the marginal group working on conflict issues. This 
view is the focus of this paper, but it should be contrasted with and put in 
context within the general construction of the World Bank as a development 
agency, to illuminate the difficulties that ‘conflict junkies’ have in raising 
institutional interest and awareness of conflict issues.23  
People internal and external to the World Bank have come to see it more 
as a development agency than as an instrument for dealing with post-war 
reconstruction, as its seminal foundational idea proposed. The continuous 
morphogenesis of the Bank since the 1960s has put emphasis the ‘D’ – de-
velopment – rather than the ‘R’ – reconstruction – of the IBRD. This trans-
formation is more a result of altering practice and discursive formation than 
any substantive change in formal mandate. According to the IBRD’s Articles 
of Agreement – the constituent document – its purpose includes ‘…the resto-
ration of economies destroyed or disrupted by war, the reconversion of pro-
ductive facilities to peacetime needs… [and] in the immediate postwar years, 
to assist in bringing about a smooth transition from a wartime to a peacetime 
economy’.24 Even though the Articles stipulate that resources should be 
spent with equitable consideration to both reconstruction and development, 
the discursive formation of the World Bank – highly influenced by the 
IDA’s softer, more development-focused approach – has created a bias to-
wards development. This should be seen against the backdrop of the Cold 
War, and how the political aspect of post-war reconstruction and its geopo-
litical connotations negatively affected the security–development nexus.  
The political character of conflicts is another important factor in explain-
ing why the World Bank has kept a distance from matters related to security, 
defence and conflicts. Its mandate reads that it ‘…shall not interfere in the 
political affairs of any member; nor shall they be influenced in their deci-
sions by the political character of the member or members concerned. Only 
economic considerations shall be relevant to their decisions…’.25 Through 
this strongly non-political mandate, reconstruction in conflict areas became 
interpreted as a political project, whereas development was viewed as a non-
political activity in line with considerations of economic growth and sustain-
able development, according to widely held principles. While post-conflict 
reconstruction was seen as being too political in intention – due not least to 
Cold War geopolitics and the political aspect of conflicts – institutional de-
                                                     
23  ‘Conflict junkie’ is an internal, self-referring term of those working on conflict issues, 
and encompasses three interesting aspects: that working on conflicts is considered anoma-
lous to general World Bank activities; that it is addictive; and that it is a struggle against 
the majority. The person who introduced me to the term said that she had been among the 
first conflict junkies in the Bank when she was employed four years ago, but that lately 
more people are becoming addicted.   
24  Article I, point i and v – purpose – of the IBRD’s Articles of Agreement. Available at 
www.worldbank.org/articles.  
25  The IBRD and the IDA share this text verbatim. See the Articles of Agreement of the 
IBRD (Article IV section 10) and the IDA (Article V, section 6) both of which are called 
‘Political Activity Prohibited’. 
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velopment was hailed as an apolitical programme that was safely in line with 
undisputed universal values. Although few would disagree that also ‘devel-
opment’ might conceivably have political effects, it nevertheless became 
portrayed as a technical and managerial instrument detached from the realm 
of political intentions.  
Since the end of the Cold War, however, this discursive formation has 
been revised. The revision has been paralleled by an increased focus on the 
security–development nexus, and – on the whole – made the World Bank 
more inclined to tackle issues of conflict, reconstruction, interagency opera-
tions, and address the apolitical character of World Bank lending.  
The Bank’s 1999 adoption of the Comprehensive Development Frame-
work (CDF) came on the pretext of promoting coherence and harmonisation 
to increase development effectiveness. As the philosophical underpinning to 
the main World Bank lending mechanism, the CDF emphasises holism and 
the interconnection of all elements of development.26 However, the Bank’s 
apolitical mandate has ruled out issues of security, defence and military,27 
prohibiting political and diplomatic activity and rendering direct cooperation 
with military actors impossible. The CDF consolidated the World Bank’s 
status as the world’s leading development agency while simultaneously ex-
plicitly detaching itself from matters of a political nature. The CDF put 
stronger emphasis on the borrowing governments and their ownership of 
Bank-supported operations. The general guideline is that the World Bank is 
to work with and through governments as its sole counterpart. Any involve-
ment of other actors should come at the request of the government in ques-
tion.  
The emergence of the World Bank as a development agency helped to 
sideline it from matters related to conflict. This historical trajectory has im-
paired its role and relevance to new comprehensive approaches that invoke 
inter-agency cooperation within the war-to-peace continuum. Moreover, 
whole-of-government approaches aim at coordinating actors aligned to the 
segments of diplomacy, development and defence – the 3Ds. Whereas na-
tional governments and the UN have agencies relating to these segments,28 
the World Bank represents merely one ‘D’ – development – which makes 
intra-organisational harmonisation of traditionally separate segments diffi-
cult. Among the development community there has, however, been an exter-
nal push following the events of ‘9/11’ for greater alignment with the secu-
rity segment. In 2002, US President G.W. Bush elevated development to 
become the third pillar of US foreign policy, alongside the traditional diplo-
                                                     
26  The elements are social, structural, human, governance, environment, economic and fi-
nancial. Overarching objective is poverty reduction (meaning economic growth and sus-
tainable development) and is based on four principles: long-term holistic vision, country 
ownership, country-led partnership and results focused. See World Bank (1999) A Pro-
posal for a Comprehensive Development Framework. Available at 
www.worldbank.org/cdf 
27  The World Bank has been engaged in Security Sector Reform (SSR), although indirectly, 
through enforcing conditions of fiscal stability and budget balance on loan-recipient coun-
tries. Through Public Sector Reform and the Public Expenditure Review the World Bank 
enjoys leverage to influence government spending by proposing cuts in public expendi-
ture. Decreases in defence spending and military staff expenditures are regularly chosen 
to achieve budgetary balance.  
28   The UN can draw on UNDP (development), DPKO (military) and DPA (diplomacy), 
while, for example,. the USA has USAID, the Pentagon and the State Department.  
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macy and defence.29 Albeit initially reluctant, the World Bank has increas-
ingly accommodated the security–development nexus and responded to other 
general inventions of the international community regarding how to react to 
what are seen as new security threats.30 
Bringing Reconstruction back onto the Agenda 
 
Despite its confining mandate, the World Bank has ample reasons and possi-
bilities to play an important role in conflict-affected countries. Processes 
external to the Bank concerning how best to respond to crises and the re-
moulding of the relevant international apparatus no longer go unheeded. This 
change is due both to altered conceptions internally in the Bank, concerning 
its mandate and how best to achieve its mission statement, and to the fact 
that other international actors have increasingly called on the Bank to re-
spond to emergency situations and take a lead in reconstruction of conflict-
affected countries.  
It is not only external factors that have influenced the World Bank to in-
crease its focus on conflicts. An altered understanding of how security and 
development are interconnected has triggered Bank staff to call for reform-
ing the international reconstruction architecture by ‘bringing the R back into 
IBRD’.31 This heightened focus on the reconstruction role marks a signifi-
cant shift influencing how the Bank deals with and relates to themes associ-
ated with fragile states, conflicts and inter-agency cooperation. The key to 
the World Bank’s ambiguous relation to conflicts and post-conflict situation 
is found in the junction between its original apolitical mandate and later evo-
lution into a development agency on the one side, and its explicit objective 
of contributing to immediate post-conflict reconstruction on the other. The 
recently adopted operational policies on how to respond to crises and emer-
gencies thus mark a critical shift towards greater attention to and enhanced 
capabilities in conflicts and emergencies.  
The World Bank and Conflicts 
  
In recent decades the World Bank has increasingly been called upon by 
member governments, including those in crisis, and other actors integral to 
the international community, to respond to emergency situations and con-
tribute to or lead international support for inter-agency recovery and recon-
struction programmes. As explained above, the Bank’s policies, processes 
and organisational structure, in addition to its restrictive mandate, were 
originally devised to apply in different contexts: they have consequently 
proved inadequate to the its evolving role and new tasks under recognition of 
the security–development nexus. In response to the discursive changes of the 
                                                     
29  US National Security Strategy. 2002.  
30  NATO’s Comprehensive Approach, the UN’s Integrated Mission and the concepts of 
Responsibility to Protect and the Protection of Civilians should all – along with the efforts 
of MNE5 – be seen in the context of new solutions to what’s understood as new problems.  
31  Point 8 in World Bank Responding Effectively to Crises and Emergencies, proceedings, 
Washington DC, 2–3 May 2007.  
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international aid community and seeking to address new emerging conflicts 
and help the war to peace transition, the World Bank has officially recog-
nised the need for a ‘…flexible, principle-based umbrella policy and acceler-
ated emergency procedure that will enable it to respond rapidly and effec-
tively to all types of emergencies’.32 This in turn has made possible the adop-
tion of a new policy statement – Rapid Response to Crises and Emergencies 
– with guidelines for Bank engagement in conflict-affected countries and 
fragile states.  
This policy, denoted Operational Policies (OP) 8.00, replaces Lending by 
the Bank for Emergencies, OP. 8.50, which served as the steering document 
since the executive directors of the World Bank last discussed its emergency 
policy in 1988. The new OP 8.00 should be seen against the backdrop of at 
least three interlinked issues: general discursive changes within the interna-
tional community influencing the security–development nexus, including 
how to response to war-to-peace transitions understood as a continuum; that 
the World Bank in this trajectory has repeatedly has been called upon to par-
ticipate in and support international inter-agency operations, but its apolitical 
mandate and restrictive rules have prevented comprehensive engagement, 
and; internal processes which have sought to accommodate external changes 
and inquiries about World Bank support. The formation of the Conflict Pre-
vention and Reconstruction Unit and the LICUS/ Fragile States initiative 
should be seen in the context of this latter point.  
Conflict Prevention and Reconstruction, LICUS and Fragile States 
 
Until recently the World Bank’s discourse on and engagement in conflict-
affected countries were spearheaded by two separate units – the Conflict 
Prevention and Reconstruction (CPR) Unit, managing the Post-Conflict 
Fund; and the LICUS initiative, later renamed the Fragile States Group 
(FSG). The CPR Unit emerged in 1997, and the FSG in late 2001.33 From 
July 2007 – and following the adoption of new World Bank policy on con-
flict-affected countries – these two groups merged into the Fragile and Con-
flict-Affected Countries Unit.  
 
Conflict Prevention  
The CPR Unit provides guidance on how to integrate conflict sensitivity 
throughout World Bank activities and programmes, and thus seeks a more 
comprehensive approach than mere post-conflict reconstruction to optimise 
policy and project design in conflict-affected countries.34 Approaches in-
clude community-driven development in war-torn societies, demobilisation 
and reintegration programs and de-mining.35 To make peace sustainable in 
                                                     
32  World Bank. 2007. Toward A New Framework for Rapid Bank Response to Crises and 
Emergencies, p. 13.  
33  The CPR Unit was initially named the Post Conflict Unit.  
34  See World Bank, 1998. Post-Conflict Reconstruction. The role of the World Bank. Wash-
ington DC: World Bank.  
35  See World Bank. 2004. The Role of the World Bank in Conflict and Development: An 
Evolving Agenda.  
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the aftermath of conflict and to ease the war-to-peace transition, the CPR 
Unit seeks to ‘…rebuild social capital, empower and provide voice to com-
munities, and generally rebuild the social fabric torn apart by violent con-
flict’36 while simultaneously helping post-conflict governments to develop 
national budgets in order to strengthen government ownership of national 
decision-making. 
The CPR Unit is guided by Operational Policy 2.30 – Development Co-
operation and Conflict (adopted January 2001) – on the role of the World 
Bank in relation to conflict.37 Both the CPR and OP 2.30 recognise that that 
the social dimensions – economic and social stability and human security – 
are preconditions for sustainable development, and that conflict might re-
verse the development gains and adversely affect the Bank’s overall mission. 
OP 2.30 thus enhances the World Bank’s capacity for rapid and flexible re-
sponse, enabling it to apply its full potential to break conflict cycles. OP 2.30 
provides ‘rules of engagement’ for pre-conflict, conflict and immediate post-
conflict situations. In countries deemed vulnerable to conflict, the World 
Bank shall use its usual instruments to promote economic growth and pov-
erty reduction through development assistance, in order to minimise poten-
tial causes of conflict by mainstreaming conflict-sensitivity measures in its 
assistance. When conflict breaks out between countries or within a country, 
the World Bank has traditionally withdrawn, particularly when the govern-
ment collapses or if the government itself is part of the conflict. By contrast, 
OP 2.30 specifies that the World Bank may continue its work as long as cer-
tain criteria are met and the crisis is not too detrimental to its projects and 
stipulated objectives. In conflict contexts the World Bank is to continue its 
efforts at poverty reduction if possible, provide information on the socio-
economic impact of emergency assistance to partner institutions upon their 
request, analyse the impact of the conflict on economic and social develop-
ment to either withdraw or sustain work, and to prepare for expanding its 
assistance as opportunities arise. In post-conflict countries and countries re-
emerging from conflict the World Bank shall support economic and social 
recovery and sustainable development through investment and development 
policy advice, with particular sensitivity to the needs of war-affected 
groups.38 Support to transitional countries goes primarily through the regular 
Country Assistance Strategy (CAS), which is the Bank’s response to the 
Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers (PRSPs) of client governments. Coun-
tries in transition which do not have a prepared PRSP and responding CAS 
are eligible for an Interim Strategy Note, which is a short to medium-term 
plan for World Bank involvement in countries affected by conflict.  
The Post-Conflict Needs Assessment (PCNA) provides an important tool 
in the CPR Unit’s work in countries that emerge from conflict as it helps 
determine a country’s funding needs and longer-term reconstruction plan. It 
emerged from 2003 as a result of coordinated efforts by the UN and the 
                                                     
36  World Bank, 2003. Community-Driven Reconstruction as an Instrument in War-to-Peace 
Transition. CPR Working Papers No. 7, p. iv.  
37  OP 2.30 is based on the 1998 World Bank publication Post-Conflict Reconstruction: The 
Role of the World Bank. This paper was endorsed by the World Bank Board of Executive 
Directors in May 1997 as A Framework for World Bank Involvement in Post-Conflict Re-
construction.  
38  See Operational Policy 2.30 Development and Conflict, notably section 2.  
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Bank.39 PCNA involves a comprehensive process which the World Bank 
coordinates with the UN and national authorities, and ‘…serves as a tool for 
integrated planning across the political, security, economic and social areas 
for post-conflict situations’.40 PCNA recognises the challenges facing fragile 
states – notably the severe lack of general state capacity – as it maps the ter-
rain of key needs in a country emerging from conflict.41 PCNA aims to pro-
vide better coordination of international efforts across the political, security, 
economic, development and humanitarian spheres. The PCNA is thus highly 
relevant for a Comprehensive Approach, and it largely complies with the 
demand of inter-agency cooperation internal and external to the Bank.42 The 
PCNA, however, only becomes active in post-conflict situations, and conse-
quently it is largely confined to countries emerging from conflict. As the 
recent PCNA review report reads, ‘PCNA typically takes place in post-
conflict countries governed by transitional authorities with two to three year 
mandate, prior to elections’.43 PCNA is closely part of an ongoing peace 
process, while it also establishes a conceptual basis for an interim PRSP and 
the Bank’s CAS. The PCNA is thus both a political and technical exercise.44 
Although the PCNA is novel in terms of inter-agency cooperation addressing 
the various spheres and segments of a post-conflict situation, it is largely 
limited to funding issues concerning development and reconstruction efforts 
in post-conflict situations. It does not address conflicts per se, but demon-
strates an inclination towards issues previously understood outside the 
Bank’s mandate and scope.  
OP 2.30 and the scope of the CPR Unit show that the World Bank has 
evolved into engaging more in conflict. It does, nevertheless, take precau-
tions – with reference to its apolitical mandate – that are open to interpreta-
tion and thus subject to the political composition and willingness of the 
World Bank board.45 OP 2.30 to a considerable degree requires a govern-
ment as counterpart in order for a country to qualify for Bank involvement. 
In effect, the LICUS initiative largely counters this dilemma.  
 
                                                     
39   Since 2003 PCNA exercises have been conducted in Iraq, Afghanistan, Timor-Leste, 
Liberia, Haiti, Sudan, Somalia and Darfur.  
40   See ‘PCNA and TRM’ at http://go.worldbank.org/VY5NFIL510.   
41   UNDG and World Bank, 2007. Joint Guidance Note on Integrated Recovery Planning 
using Post Conflict Needs Assessments and Transitional Results Frameworks. Working 
draft September 2007. Available at www.undg.org/docs/7818/PCNA-
TRF%20GUIDANCE%20NOTE%20Working%20Draft%209-2007.pdf 
42   For more information of PCNA in relation to Comprehensive Approach, see chapter 5.2. 
in Markus Derblom, R. Egnell and C. Nilsson, 2007. The Impact of Strategic Concepts 
and Approaches on the Effects-Based Approach to Operations. A baseline collective as-
sessment report. Swedish Defence Research Agency. 
43   UN and World Bank, 2007. In Support of Peacebuilding: Strengthening the Post-Conflict 
Needs Assessment, p. 3. Available at 
http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTLICUS/Resources/388758-
1094226297907/Review_Report__In_Support_of_Peacebuilding__Strengthening_the_PC
NA.pdf 
44   See UNDP, World Bank and UNDG, 2004. PCNA – Practical Guide to Multilateral 
Needs Assessments in Post Conflict Situations.  
45  The new OP 8.00 counters many of these precautions, and is more thoroughly dealt with 
below in the section on ‘Fragile and Conflict-Affected Countries. Merging the Agenda’.  
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LICUS and Fragile States 
In November 2001 the Low-Income Countries Under Stress (LICUS) initia-
tive was set up by the World Bank,46 as a result of inter alia the events of 
9/11 and the aid effectiveness debate.47 LICUS was initiated as a means to 
recommend ways to help countries characterised by weak policies, institu-
tions and governance get onto a path of sustained economic growth and sus-
tainable poverty reduction.48 LICUS provides means to support and help 
countries otherwise are disqualified for Bank lending either because they are 
in arrears to the Bank, have a non-accrual status,49 are affected by an ongo-
ing armed conflict, lack a legitimate government (and thus a legitimate 
World Bank counterpart), or if the government itself is part of the conflict 
which thus makes traditional lending potentially too politicised.50 The World 
Bank defines LICUS as those countries that score 3.2 or less on the Country 
Policy and Institutional Assessment (CPIA) rating. Core LICUS are coun-
tries that score 3.0 or less on the CPIA, but the Bank also monitors marginal 
LICUS, which are those placed between 3.0 and 3.2 on the CPIA. The CPIA 
is a diagnostic instrument designed to measure a country’s overall govern-
ance environment, policies and institutional arrangements.51 LICUS, or frag-
ile states, face risks of conflict and political instability. From 1992 to 2002, 
21 out of 26 countries with intermediate or worse civil conflicts were also 
categorised as LICUS.52 
The LICUS initiative signifies that the World Bank has recognised the 
potential of development failure if it refrains from engaging in difficult envi-
ronments and countries in the transition from war to peace and recovery to 
reconstruction. In 2005 the LICUS initiative shifted its scope, from general 
aid effectiveness to state building and peace-building objectives. From Janu-
ary 2006 the term ‘fragile states’ replaced ‘LICUS’.  
The work on LICUS and fragile states suggests the need to increase such 
countries’ ‘…capacity and accountability; to forge peace, security, and de-
velopment links; to harmonize donor assistance; and to develop strong and 
                                                     
46  Initially a task force on LICUS was set up. In March 2004 this was transformed into a 
trust fund following the transfer of US$ 25 million from the IBRD surplus, later replen-
ished with $25 million in 2006 and another $30 million in 2007. 
47  World Bank, 2005. Conflict and Development. Presentation given at by World Bank 
staff; World Bank Seminar at the Kobe and Hiroshima Universities seminars on Global 
Development Challenges Facing Humanity, 26 May 2005.  
48  See World Bank Engaging with Fragile States. An IEG Review of World Bank Support to 
Low-Income Countries Under Stress, the World Bank, Washington DC. Available at 
www.worldbank.org/ieg. 
49  In brief, arrears mean that client government’s loan repayment is overdue or unpaid. This 
might lead the World Bank to give the country a non-accrual status, meaning that the 
World Bank will not disburse further loans until the country’s arrears are cleared. Non-
accrual status is given a country when its oldest payment arrears are six months overdue. 
To be eligible for further or new loans the client must clear all payment arrears in full, 
whereby the country regains its accrual status.  
50  From 2004 LICUS focused on Central African Republic, Haiti, Liberia, Myanmar, Soma-
lia, Sudan, Togo and Zimbabwe. As of April 2007 Central African Republic and Haiti 
were removed from the list while Côte d’Ivoire has been added.  
51  The CPIA is a diagnostic tool applied to all IDA-eligible countries, intended to capture 
the quality of a country’s policies and institutional arrangements. It rates countries against 
a set of 16 criteria grouped in four clusters: i) economic management; ii) structural poli-
cies; iii) policies for social inclusion and equity; and iv) public sector management and in-
stitutions. Although quantitative and stringent in appearance, the CPIA is a subjective 
codification – undertaken by Bank-staff – of highly qualitative data.  
52  World Bank, 2005. Fragile States – Good Practice in Country Assistance Strategies. 
Washington DC: Operations Policy and Country Service, World Bank. 
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flexible institutional responses’.53 Hence, the LICUS/ Fragile States initiative 
together with the CPR Unit provide an input into and means for the Bank to 
work with countries that would otherwise be ineligible for regular World 
Bank lending. In July 2007 the LICUS initiative/ Fragile States group and 
the CPR Unit merged into the Fragile and Conflict-Affected Countries Unit, 
in order to harmonise and enhance the World Bank’s engagement in coun-
tries affected by conflict, and to accommodate the rising recognition of the 
security–development nexus internal to the World Bank. 
The LICUS initiative brought to the fore a heightened focus on countries 
otherwise ineligible for World Bank support. It demonstrated that the World 
Bank is highly relevant and should apply its core competencies also in coun-
tries that would normally not qualify for regular support. It moreover chal-
lenged the strict interpretation of the Bank’s mandate in various contexts. 
Several lessons from the LICUS initiative have now become integral princi-
ples in World Bank thinking on conflict-affected countries. First, the Bank 
recognises that programmes need to be based on a thorough understanding of 
the political dynamics of reform, while also reflecting the security–
development nexus and its links to peace-building goals. Second, the impor-
tance of harmonisation and policy coherence between diplomatic, peace-
keeping, state-building and economic reconstruction initiatives is recognised. 
Third, the Bank acknowledges that emergency recovery programmes are 
undermined if peace-building issues and state institutions dealing with peace 
and security are excluded from its programmes and processes. Fourth, as the 
World Bank recognises that its core competencies are economy and devel-
opment, its support for peace-building and security – always at the request of 
client governments – should be carried out in cooperation with other interna-
tional partners holding such expertise.54  
Drawing on the lessons from both the LICUS initiative and the CPR Unit 
and the above-mentioned principles, in conjunction with its increasingly be-
ing called upon by other institutions and client government to take a stronger 
lead in reconstruction efforts, the Bank has largely accommodated the secu-
rity–development nexus. These tenets underpin the new Fragile and Con-
flict-Affected Countries Unit – which demonstrates that changes have indeed 
taken place on the structural and policy level, expanding the scope of the 
World Bank and thus its capacity to respond to crises and emergencies.  
Fragile and Conflict-Affected Countries:  
Merging the Agenda 
 
On 1 July 2008, the LICUS/ Fragile States Unit and the Conflict Prevention 
and Reconstruction Unit merged, creating the Fragile and Conflict-Affected 
Countries Unit. This consolidation should be seen against the backdrop of 
the World Bank’s adoption of the Operational Policy 8.00 (Rapid Response 
to Crises and Emergencies), new thinking around the security–development 
                                                     
53  World Bank. 2007. A Guide to the World Bank. 2nd edition. Washington, DC: World 
Bank, p. 99. Emphasis added.  
54  World Bank. 2007. Toward a New Framework for Rapid Bank Responses to Crises and 
Emergencies. Washington DC: World Bank, especially paragraph 61. 
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nexus internal to the Bank, the fact that it increasingly is called upon to take 
greater part in international crisis management, with the intent of enhancing 
the effectiveness and efficiency of World Bank support to fragile and con-
flict-affected countries. The establishment of this new unit does not represent 
a critical discursive breach: rather, it enhances and manifests ongoing proc-
esses resulting from internal initiatives and external demands.  
The establishment of the Fragile and Conflict-Affected Countries Unit 
implies a shift in where conflict issues are dealt with inside the World 
Bank’s organisational matrix. Whereas the CPR Unit was based in the Sus-
tainable Development (SD) network, the LICUS/ Fragile States Unit was 
positioned under the Operations Policy and Country Services (OPCS) net-
work. Although both networks have independent vice-presidencies, the for-
mer reports to a managing director while the latter reports directly to the 
president of the World Bank. The new unit now responsible for anchoring 
the Bank’s work on conflict issues has been placed in the latter – which may 
illustrate the priority given to this area. The OPCS reports directly to the 
president and is tasked with providing general policy input to all operational 
activities.55 Hence the positioning in OPCS might thus provide stronger op-
erational influence than the case would have been if the new unit had been 
positioned in the SD network.  
From Narrow Rules to Broader Principles – New Operational Policy on 
Crises and Emergencies 
 
The Rapid Response to Crises and Emergencies, OP 8.00, represents a fresh 
interpretation of the World Bank’s mandate. According to the OPCS vice-
president, the new policy aims ‘…to provide faster, flexible and more inno-
vative financing and support to client countries to promptly deal with emer-
gencies, and also embedded in the policy is the objective to reduce the vul-
nerability to future disasters’.56 The statement recognises that the World 
Bank has sidelined itself for too long, making itself irrelevant in cases where 
its expertise and resources have been demanded. The new policy framework 
considers what the Bank can do during a conflict helping to fulfil its pro-
grammatic objective of poverty reduction through economic growth and sus-
tainable development.  
OP 8.00 outlines four guiding principles for World Bank rapid response 
to crises and emergencies:57  
 
a) application of the rapid response policy to address major adverse 
economic and/or social impacts resulting from an actual or imminent 
natural or man-made crisis or disaster; 
                                                     
55  Whether to place the new unit in the SD or OPCS network was the subject of consider-
able internal debate. As a result, much of the CPR staff, notably its senior employees, 
moved to a new unit in the Africa region.  
56  Opening Remarks by Jeffrey Gutman, Vice President, Operations Policy and Country 
Services, The World Bank at UN/ ISDR Global Platform for Disaster Reduction, 5 June  
2007, Geneva.  
57  The following list is taken verbatim from the OP 8.00 document Rapid Response to Cri-
ses and Emergencies, emphasis added.  
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b) continued focus of the Bank’s direct assistance on its core 
development and economic competencies and always in line with its 
mandate, including in all situations where the Bank supports peace-
building objectives and relief to recovery transitions; 
c) close coordination and establishment of appropriate partnership 
arrangements with other development partners, including the United 
Nations, in line with the comparative advantages and core 
competencies of each partner;  
d) appropriate oversight arrangements, including corporate governance 
and fiduciary oversight, to ensure appropriate scope, design, speed, 
and monitoring and supervision of emergency operations. 
 
The highlighted sections indicate some of the new aspects that OP 8.00 pro-
vides to the World Bank’s engagement in conflict.58 
 
Rapid response 
Experience has taught the World Bank that emergencies require urgent and 
rapid response. Delays may result in missed opportunities for the interna-
tional community, with severe consequences for the affected people while 
also undermining the Bank’s overall mission. Its traditional instrument for 
emergency assistance – emergency recovery loan (ERL) – is intended to be 
fast-tracked for quick disbursement, but experience over the past five years 
show that on average ERLs took in excess of nine months to be processed, 
from proposal to conceptualisation and implementation.59 OP 8.00 acknowl-
edges that flexibility, timeliness and simplicity are critical to an effective 
response to emergency situations and thus recognises the need to minimise 
or bypass the cumbersome regular approval procedures of the World Bank. 
However, the document does not specify what it means by rapid, but the 
Fragile and Conflict-Affected Countries Unit webpage indicates the inten-
tion to disburse funds within as little as three months.60 
 
Imminent emergencies 
The term ‘imminent’ indicates that also pre-conflict issues are of concern, 
which thus counters earlier policy guidelines designed primarily to address 
emergencies that had already happened. The new policy allows for measures 
to help reduce the risks and mitigate impacts of imminent emergencies and 
crises. These include balancing ex ante and ex post risk mitigation and con-
trol measures, to enable timely response to that imminent conflicts and 
emergencies. An objective thus is to preserve social, economic and institu-
tional capital to reduce the eventuality of conflict and strengthen important 
means necessary in emergency situations and in the return from conflict.61  
                                                     
58  Unless otherwise specified, the remaining footnote references refer to World Bank, 2007. 
Towards A New Framework for Rapid Bank Response to Crises and Emergencies, Wash-
ington, DC: World Bank. The following presentation and paragraphs derive largely from 
this text and the OP 8.00 document.  
59  See page 2 and footnote 5.  
60  See www.worldbank.org/conflict  
61  Following the discursive realm of OP 8.00, the World Bank has adopted a Risk Identifi-
cation Worksheet which is a prerequisite for all World Bank disbursements and thus a 
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Responding to imminent emergencies and crises is in fact nothing new to 
the World Bank. Over the past decade it has responded to numerous emer-
gencies, but most of these have been natural disasters. The Bank successfully 
established emergency assistance to Peru and Bolivia to counter the immi-
nent effects of the 1998 El Niño; an emergency fire control and prevention 
project was put in place in Brazil in response to increased risk of ‘escaped’ 
fire associated with the drought following the rainfall deficit in 1998; and a 
project was implemented to prevent serious structural damage and imminent 
disaster associated with the potential collapse of the Morazàn Dam in Hon-
duras in 1993. These were imminent emergencies due to natural causes, not 
man-made crises, for which the new policy provides an opening.62  
 
Man-made crises 
OP 8.00 implies a shift in rationale for responding to emergencies from 
cause to impacts and effects. Although this shift is consistent with the pri-
mary objective already embedded in previous policy to assist countries 
struck by ‘an emergency that seriously dislocates its economy and calls for a 
quick response from the government and the Bank’ (OP 8.50), the focus on 
man-made emergencies enables stronger and more comprehensive involve-
ment in emergencies and conflicts that may imply political aspects. As such, 
the inclusion of man-made emergencies shifts the emphasis from the strictly 
physical aspects to the political dimensions of crisis management. Hence it 
explicitly challenges the apolitical aspect entrenched in the World Bank, 
which – at least in connection with emergencies – has prevented the Bank 
from responding.  
In 2006 the Central African Republic experienced problems in receiving 
World Bank support to the imminent crisis it was faced with. As a fragile 
state in transition from prolonged crisis, it encountered problems when an 
armed rebellion originating from Darfur entered the country in the northeast, 
destabilising a region where the security forces had limited access. This as 
such was not a legitimate reason for increasing World Bank support due to 
the political aspect, although the situation in the country in general was 
worsening. It was the low fiduciary and administrative capacity and the 
population’s call for rapid and visible development results that finally justi-
fied the accelerated preparation of a LICUS Trust Fund grant of US$6.8 mil-
lion.63  
A similar case was found in Timor Leste, where the political crisis in 
2006 led the government to request renewed international peacekeeping as-
sistance. The government asked the World Bank for urgent assistance to help 
it avoid sliding into state failure. But because Timor Leste was almost six 
years into its post-conflict programme and thus well past the point of receiv-
                                                     
means of dealing with risks throughout Bank operations. The worksheet lists issues of 
concern under four broad categories: i) country and/or Sub-National Level Risks; ii) Sec-
tor Governance, Policies and Institutions; c) Operation-specific Risks; and iv) Overall 
Risk (including Reputational Risks). All categories are to be dealt with in terms of de-
scription of risk, rating of risk, mitigation measures, and rating of residual risk. According 
to the likelihood of occurrence and magnitude of potential adverse impact, risks are rated 
along a four-point scale – high, substantive, moderate, and low.  
62  See Box 2 (p. 7) for more details on these cases.  
63  See Box 2 (p. 7) for more details. 
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ing support under the former OP 8.50 emergency procedure, the Bank did 
not have the formal capability or legitimacy to respond adequately, although 
this was explicitly at the request of the government.64 The new OP 8.00 pol-
icy aims at preventing such instances in the future.  
 
In line with its mandate 
This part is intended mainly to safeguard against any potential expansion of 
World Bank assistance and widening of dedicated scope outside its mandate 
and core competencies of economic growth and sustainable development. 
The mandate – to promote economic development, increase productivity, 
and raise standards of living in less developed areas – and core competencies 
– economic growth and sustainable development – will necessarily deter-
mine the nature, scope and limitations of wherever the Bank seeks to engage, 
intervene and undertake actions. This might seem somewhat counterproduc-
tive to the above-mentioned which indicates a more radical reinterpretation 
of the apolitical mandate, but the World Bank maintains that its mandate and 
designated purposes should be interpreted in a dynamic, reasonable and re-
sponsible way that takes into account the changing nature of client govern-
ments’ needs and the interests of the organisation’s members.65 The Bank is 
allowed to make arrangements through policy changes in response to the 
evolving needs of its member countries and the broader development 
agenda. Consequently, the mandate is not an entirely fixed entity, but is open 
for interpretation and discussion at the request of member countries and the 
Bank itself, or when this is made necessary due to changed circumstances in 
the field. Here it should be noted that interpretation will always be subject to 
the political consideration of member countries and articulated through the 
World Bank’s Board of Executive Directors. The move to include man-made 
crises was one such debate, as was the inclusion of peace-building within the 
scope of the World Bank.  
 
Peace-building 
Peace-building represents a new discursive field and a recently added idiom 
to the World Bank dictionary. Three years ago almost nobody inside the or-
ganisation talked about ‘peace-building’ or used the term ‘conflict’ because 
of their close connotations with politics and issues of state security and mili-
tary defence, which are defined outside the institution’s mandate. Previous 
policies (notably OP 8.50, which preceded OP 8.00) had been largely silent 
on peace-building. This made it difficult for the Bank to support the preser-
vation of human, institutional and social capital in emergencies and crises, 
which now is recognised as crucial in war-to-peace transitions and within the 
relief-to-recovery continuum. The new policy acknowledges the need for the 
World Bank to support the international community’s peace-building objec-
tives and integrated recovery programmes that include peace-building, secu-
rity and relief activities. The peace-building component of OP 8.00 is at the 
                                                     
64  Ibid. 
65   See paragraph 6 of the Legal Opinion accompanying OP 8.00. Reference to and explana-
tion of the role of the Legal Opinion is provided in footnote 66 below.  
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heart of the new approach to conflict-affected countries, and – together with 
the inclusion of man-made crises – stands as the most novel and challenging 
part of OP 8.00, as well as being perhaps the most important component of 
‘bringing the R back into IBRD’. 
The legal opinion responding to OP 8.00 provides certain clarifications 
and reservations relating to the World Bank’s peace-building objectives and 
activities.66 It states that all objectives and activities undertaken in relation to 
OP 8.00 must be consistent with the World Bank’s guiding principles for 
engagement in conflict-affected areas, as codified in OP 2.30.67 The legal 
opinion reiterates some of these principles: e.g. ‘the Bank may not engage in 
peacemaking or peacekeeping, as they are UN functions’ and ‘financing may 
not be provided for disarming combatants or humanitarian relief’.68 Peace-
building, however, is understood as encompassing all activities needed to 
help states and societies manage the difficult transition from war to peace.  
The World Bank adheres to the UN’s conception of peace-building as in-
cluding ‘the broad spectrum of reconstruction and institution-building efforts 
necessary for a country to recover from conflict and that support the devel-
opment of integrated strategies in order to lay the foundation for sustainable 
development’.69 A similar objective is found in the IBRD’s Articles of 
Agreement concerning the role of the World Bank in reconstruction and res-
toration following war, but this had not been prevalent in Bank practice in 
recent decades. Thus, even though aspects of peace-building were in fact 
integral to the original mandate, it was undercommunicated and needed to be 
reinterpreted to accommodate new peace-building objectives and activities. 
The legal opinion reinterprets this as follows:70 In countries vulnerable to 
conflict the World Bank is to use its usual lending instrument to promote 
economic growth and poverty reduction to minimise potential causes of con-
flict. In countries in conflict the objectives are i) to continue these efforts 
maintain socio-economic assets where possible; provide information on the 
socio-economic impact of emergency assistance upon its partners’ request; 
iii) analyse the impact of conflict on economic and social development, and 
iv) prepare to render assistance as opportunities arise. In countries in transi-
tion from conflict the Bank aims to support economic and social recovery 
and sustainable development through investment and development policy 
advice focusing on war-affected groups in particular.  
Hence, peace-building might include a variety of activities. While some 
may fall within the World Bank’s development mandate, others do not. Ac-
tivities of the former type include capacity building for governmental agen-
cies, financial support and technical assistance for economic reconstruction, 
                                                     
66  All new operational policies are accompanied by a legal opinion, which is the World 
Bank’s lawyers’ assessment and legal considerations of the new policy relating the legal 
parameters set out in the Articles of Agreement in order to establish consistency between 
legal framework, policy formulation and the Board’s interpretation of it. The legal opin-
ion responding to OP 8.00 is titled ‘Legal opinion on Peace-Building, Security, and Relief 
Issues under the Bank’s Policy Framework for Rapid Response to Crises and Emergen-
cies’, issued 22 March 2007. The legal opinion is annexed to Toward A New Framework 
for Rapid Response to Crises and Emergencies (World Bank, 2005). 
67  OP 2.30 Development Cooperation and Conflict, adopted January 2001. 
68  Se paragraph 10 of the legal opinion. Cf. OP 2.30. 
69  Ibid. See paragraph 12. This citation refers to UN Security Council Resolution no. 1645, 
which relates to the establishment of the Peace-Building Commission).  
70  The following draws on Legal Opinion, paragraph 13.  
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rebuilding legal and judicial systems and financing labour-intensive em-
ployment activities. Activities that clearly fall outside the World Bank’s le-
gal authority include ‘peace-keeping, disarmament of combatants, negotia-
tion of peace accords, or other political reconciliation processes, and organ-
ising and holding elections’.71 The Bank aims to focus on its core develop-
ment and economic competencies: other objectives and activities should 
come as a response to member-country requests. 
 
Relief 
As noted, the World Bank does not consider relief as part of its core compe-
tencies but rather as lying outside the scope of its mandate. However, where 
previous policy explicitly prohibited World Bank financing of relief activi-
ties, the current policy is not so rigid. This is due not least to recognition of 
the relief-to-recovery transition as a continuum – rather than as distinct 
points in time – and that several fields of activity in which the World Bank 
has comparative expertise fall within this continuum. Common to these ac-
tivities are that they address the social aspects of recovery, like support to 
reintegration of affected persons (including refugees, IDPs and ex-
combatants) and semi-permanent settlements. Such support, however, should 
come at the request of governments or partners among the UN agencies.  
The World Bank acknowledges that other agencies may be better able to 
provide immediate relief, but this does not disqualify it from addressing is-
sues along the relief-to-recovery continuum, nor does it mean that it should 
ignore the continuum. Previous Bank policy, however, has led to quite re-
strictive interpretations, at times resulting in actions being counterproductive 
to its overall mission. The new policy allows for a more open interpretation 
of ‘relief’ that has implications for what the Bank may and may not do, al-
though such operations are not integral parts of its core economic and devel-
opment competencies.  
How the World Bank responds to and deals with relief issues is thus a 
matter of coordination and appropriate partnerships with other international 
organisations.  
 
Coordination and appropriate partnership 
Generally, OP 8.00 opens for World Bank engagement in areas traditionally 
not seen as falling within the interpretation of its core economic and devel-
opment competencies. The Bank is nevertheless allowed to contribute and 
support other activities – although, as it is not an implementing agency itself, 
partnerships with other institutions are necessary. Here we might note that 
the World Bank generally has a weak reputation when it comes to coordina-
tion and partnership with other international organisations, because it tends 
to see itself as the international community’s supreme development agency 
with a mandate that restricts activities outside its development scope. The 
World Bank’s counterpart is by default government, and it always aims to 
work with and through governments and with their consent. Under the new 
policy framework, however, the World Bank recognises that close coordina-
                                                     
71  Legal Opinion, paragraph 14.  
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tion and the establishment of appropriate partnership with other donors and 
partners (notably various UN agencies) are necessary for a rapid, efficient 
and effective response to crises and emergencies. The partnership arrange-
ment should reflect the comparative advantages and core competencies of 
each of the partner organisations involved. 
The war-to-peace transition or relief-to-recovery continuum implies a 
host of actors that need to be properly coordinated to draw on their respec-
tive competencies. The World Bank holds an important role in mobilising, 
coordinating and administering international support for emergency recov-
ery. Hence it aspires to act as a catalyst for comprehensive and integrated 
approaches, linking shorter-term recovery with longer-term objectives of 
reconstruction, institutional development to improve national disaster man-
agement and stability and peace in post-conflict situations.  
‘Whole-of-government’ approaches to conflict-affected countries are, 
however, the World Bank’s Gordian knot. Experience suggests that the war-
to-peace transition should be met with efforts that simultaneously draw on 
the capabilities of the traditionally independent segments of defence, devel-
opment and diplomacy.72 Whole-of-government approaches aim at harmo-
nising and coordinating the approach to fragile states. Whereas independent 
states and the UN have actors representing the three spheres of diplomacy, 
defence and development, the World Bank is restricted to the latter – making 
comprehensive whole-of-government approaches difficult. The World 
Bank’s contribution thus entails coordination and participation through ap-
propriate partnership. There is, however, a limiting drawback. ‘The restric-
tive view that the Bank cannot support recovery program that include activi-
ties (e.g. relief, security, and specialised peace building) that are outside its 
traditional core competencies, or cannot extend activities within such com-
petencies beyond its traditional counterparts in the country, undermines the 
Bank’s ability to participate fully in a coordinated and integrated interna-
tional response’.73 
While being restrictive, the third guiding principle underpinning OP 8.00 
also opens for new interpretations of the World Bank’s role in integrated 
international responses to conflicts. The principle is intended to safeguard 
against any potential widening or expansion of its assistance into areas out-
side the Bank’s mandate and core competencies. World Bank support to re-
lief, security and specialised peace-building activities should first and fore-
most come at the request of the borrower and client government. Moreover, 
support should be channelled through other agencies with core competencies 
in these fields. These actors would thus need to take the lead role and re-
sponsibility for preparation, appraisal and supervision of activities within 
these areas, with the World Bank – at best – providing information and fi-
nancial resources. Although supportive, the World Bank nevertheless is to 
keep these issues at arm’s length.  
 
                                                     
72  See Stewart and Brown, 2007, Greater than the sum of its parts?. 
73  Paragraph 57, emphasis added.  
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Concluding Remarks 
 
The World Bank is under constant transformation as a response to changing 
circumstances in the field, internal processes and the political priorities of its 
member states. Inertia, however, is more prevalent than rapid adjustment. 
New types of conflicts call for novel responses that include the World Bank 
as the leading development agency worldwide. Its expanded role in conflict-
affected countries necessitates increased coordination with other actors. This 
must nevertheless always be in tune with its core competencies and mandate 
– and the latter tends to be interpreted rather strictly.  
World Bank participation in a Comprehensive Approach involving shared 
planning and implementation of both civil and military actors to conflict-
affected countries remains difficult, even though the new operational policy 
allows for a stronger commitment to crises and emergencies. The shift from 
narrow rules to broader principles does not open for direct and explicit part-
nership with military actors. The World Bank still works through govern-
ments and with their consent. The increased complexity of crises and the 
Bank’s expanded engagement in conflict-affected countries has raised the 
importance of coordination among several different actors. Although infor-
mal meetings and information-sharing might take place, any formalised and 
orchestrated partnership with military actors – including UN peacekeeping 
missions74 – remains difficult for the World Bank. The problems associated 
with different mandates and institutional cultures remain to be dealt with. As 
the most significant development agency worldwide, the World Bank re-
mains of key relevance to the reconstruction and development efforts of a 
Comprehensive Approach. Dialogue within the frames provided by the 
Bank’s existing policy is thus vital for sharing knowledge and experience, 
and bridging cultural gaps between the range of actors involved in a Com-
prehensive Approach.  
The OP 8.00 – Rapid response to Crises and Emergencies – marks a 
critical shift in the Bank’s ability to respond to emergencies and crises, and 
to coordinate and plan activities with other organisations. As such, OP 8.00 
has increased the general relevance of the World Bank to international inter-
agency and multi-purpose operations in conflict-affected countries.  
OP 8.00 introduces four key and novel elements to the World Bank’s re-
sponse capacity in conflict-affected countries. The first is speed. The new 
policy and aligned procedures enable the Bank to swiftly mobilise resources 
and get the resources rapidly on the ground in countries facing imminent, 
recurring and ongoing crises. Secondly, it enhances the World Bank’s ability 
to mobilise the right expertise from anywhere in the organisation: this results 
from placing the Fragile States and Conflict-Affected Countries Unit, which 
deals directly with issues relating to OP 8.00, in the OPCS network. Thirdly, 
it engenders synergy with other international organisations as the new policy 
opens for stronger coordination and partnership, based on mutual under-
standing and respect for the different organisations’ core competencies, as 
appropriate. Fourth, by acknowledging the need to recognise and respond to 
situations of crises, war, relief, recovery and development as a continuum, 
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the policy has improved the sustainability of how such transitional phases 
are addressed. Long-term engagement and strategic long-term vision reduce 
the risk of future and recurring disasters.  
Although changes have been made in operational policy, World Bank en-
gagement in conflict-affected countries still remains marginal to its general 
activities. In financial terms, operations in such countries still represent a 
relatively modest portion of the Bank’s overall portfolio. 
The World Bank now recognises that the war-to-peace or relief-to-
recovery transitions are in fact a continuum and not distinct points in time, 
and that they call for specialised tailor-made approaches from range of or-
ganisations reflecting their core competencies. Such recognition seems quite 
new to the World Bank, although it is in no way novel to most parts of the 
international community. Complex and intertwined problems call for equally 
complex responses. It has, however, taken time for the World Bank to re-
spond adequately to this. The strict interpretation of its mandate and how to 
apply its core competencies have for a long time sidelined and undermined 
the Bank’s potential for playing a supportive role in inter-agency responses 
to crises. Today’s new operational policies promote a stronger inclination for 
the Bank to engage in conflict situations. Full participation in a Comprehen-
sive Approach involving civil and military actors would still be difficult. 
Nevertheless, the World Bank is an organisation important to such an ap-
proach, and it should be consulted and listened to on matters of reconstruc-
tion and development.  
